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Abstract
In°ation rates in a number of OECD follow a common trend over the past four
decades: in°ation starts out low in the 1960s, rises for a time before peaking in the
1970s or early 1980s, and then falls back to initial levels. This similarity in the behavior
of trend in°ation suggests that any explanation of long run in°ation trends ought to
apply across OECD countries. Ireland (1999) shows that a simple time inconsistency
model of monetary policy, modi¯ed to allow for a time-varying NAIRU, can explain
long run trends in U.S. in°ation. In this paper we show that this result cannot serve
as an explanation of the common trend in OECD in°ation, as it ¯ts the data only
in the U.S.. We investigate two important variants of the hypothesis: i) that time
inconsistency was an important component of central bank behavior in earlier decades,
but has become less signi¯cant in recent years, and ii) that time inconsistency problems
drive U.S. in°ation, which a®ects in°ation rates in other countries as a result of central
bankers' attempts to manage nominal exchange rate movements vis a vis the U.S. dollar.
We ¯nd that the ¯rst hypothesis ¯ts the data no better than the baseline model. We
¯nd some support for the international spillovers version of the model, but the behavior
of non-U.S. central bankers with respect to domestic unemployment rates is not well
described by the time inconsistency mechanism.
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A key feature of in°ation in many industrialized economies in recent decades was the
substantial run-up of in°ation in the late 1960s and 1970s, followed by an equally substantial
dis-in°ation in the 1980s and 1990s. In the U.S., the period of high in°ation is sometimes
referred to as the Great In°ation, and has been described as \the greatest failure of American
macroeconomic policy in the post war period" (Mayer (1999)). A substantial body of recent
research attempts to explain the rise and fall of in°ation in the U.S. but has paid little
attention to the international dimension of the issue to date. The similarity in the behavior
of trend in°ation, however, suggests that a good explanation of long run in°ation outcomes
ought to apply across OECD countries.
In this paper, we ask whether time inconsistency models of monetary policy based on
the framework of Kydland & Prescott (1977), and Barro & Gordon (1983), can explain
in°ation trends across OECD economies. Ireland (1999) ¯nds that the Kydland-Prescott,
Barro-Gordon (KPBG) model, extended to allow for a time varying NAIRU, is consistent
with the U.S. data. As the model is general enough to encompass the institutional ar-
rangements across OECD countries, it is natural to ask whether the success of the model
in matching U.S. outcomes extends to an explanation of the common trend in international
in°ation. Although the basic KPBG framework is a well known and in°uential model in
macroeconomics, there has been relatively little empirical testing of that framework. Fur-
thermore, policy insiders have questioned the relevance of these models, arguing that the
time inconsistency story is a poor representation of policymakers' behavior.1 Thus, an as-
sessment of the empirical performance of the time inconsistency mechanism for in°ation
outcomes adds to our understanding of both the causes of historical in°ation trends and
the relevance of a well established class of macroeconomic models.
Our results suggest that simplest version of the KPBG model does not ¯t the data
very well for countries other than the U.S.. We extend the model to incorporate two
plausible variants of the model: i) the hypothesis that time inconsistency was an important
component of central bank behavior in earlier decades, but has become less signi¯cant in
recent years, and ii) the view that time inconsistency problems drive U.S. in°ation, which in
turn in°uences in°ation rates in other countries as a result of the attempts of central bankers
in other countries to manage nominal exchange rate movements vis a vis the U.S. dollar.
We ¯nd that the ¯rst hypothesis ¯ts the data no better than the baseline model. We do
¯nd some support for the international spillovers version of the model, but the behavior of
non-U.S. central bankers with respect to domestic unemployment rates, as viewed through
the lens of a time inconsistency account of monetary policy, remains puzzling.
Our paper is related to the literature investigating the causes of the `Great In°ation'
1Blinder (1997), for example \¯rmly believe(s) that this theoretical problem is a nonproblem in the real
world" stating that \during my brief career as a central banker I never once witnessed or experienced this
[the in°ationary bias] temptation" (p. 13). McCallum (1995) argues that it is \inappropriate to presume
that central banks ... repeatedly engage in fruitless attempts to exploit predetermined but endogenous
expectations" (p. 209).
1in the U.S.. This literature includes Clarida, Gali, & Gertler (2000), who argue that the
rise of in°ation in the late 1960s and early 1970s was due to mistakes made by monetary
policy authorities. One view of the related literature, is that it attempts to rationalize the
conduct of policy makers during this period. Explanations include the possibility that the
Fed conducted otherwise correct monetary policy using bad data (Orphanides (2002, 2003)),
that the Fed was learning about key parameters of the economy as it went along (Sargent
(1999), Primiceri (2004)), and that the Fed was responding to unfavorable fundamentals,
perhaps ¯ltered through the lens of time inconsistency problems (Ireland (1999)). Our
paper clearly falls into this last category. The main innovation is the use of the common
international experience as a way of disciplining our empirical work.
We begin the paper with the observation that there appears to be a common trend
in OECD in°ation rates. Figures 1-7 reveal a common pattern in in°ationary outcomes,
measured by annualized quarterly percentage changes in the GDP de°ator, in the G-7
countries. The pattern, visible in the raw data, but more transparent in the 7-year centered
moving averages also displayed in the ¯gures, is as follows: in°ation starts out low in the
early 1960s in all countries. This is followed by a period of rising in°ation lasting until
the late 1970s or early 1980s in all countries except Germany and Japan, where in°ation
peaks in the early and mid 1970s, respectively. After this period of rising in°ation, in°ation
rates then fall until the present, and are generally as low or lower by the end of the 1990s
than they were in the early 1960s. The commonality of OECD in°ation rates depicted
visually in the ¯gures is con¯rmed by statistical tests showing that OECD in°ation rates
are cointegrated with one another.
Ireland (1999) observes that in°ation in the KPBG framework depends directly on
the NAIRU, implying that in°ation and unemployment should both rise and fall with the
NAIRU. As the NAIRU rises, central bankers increase their attempts to drive unemployment
down, which leads to increasing in°ation. Essentially, any long run trend in the NAIRU is
re°ected in long run in°ation and unemployment trends. Furthermore, both in°ation and
unemployment inherit the time series properties of the NAIRU. If the NAIRU is I(1), then
both in°ation and unemployment inherit the non-stationarity of the NAIRU and, according
to the model, must be cointegrated. This insight provides the basis for statistical tests of
the model, which we apply to OECD data.
Our ¯rst pass at the data is to apply the insight of Ireland, that the KPBG model
requires in°ation and unemployment to be cointegrated, to quarterly data from 13 OECD
countries going back to 1964. Not surprisingly, given the plots in the previous ¯gures, our
results suggest that in°ation and unemployment are not cointegrated in OECD countries,
with the sole exception of the U.S..
An obvious problem with our simple, ¯rst pass approach is that a number of key model
parameters (central bank preferences, the slope of the Phillips curve, etc...) are unobserved
and di±cult to estimate. Furthermore, there is no strong reason to believe that these
parameters have remained constant throughout the period of interest.2 Thus the failure of
2In fact, the literature o®ers a number of channels by which observed changes in macroeconomic conditions
2the time inconsistency model to ¯t the data may be due to a failure of the assumption that
the model parameters were unchanged over the estimation period.
To allow for this possibility, we extend the baseline model to incorporate time varying
model parameters, and show that shifts in these parameters imply structural breaks in
the cointegrating relationship. We then investigate whether allowing for structural breaks
signi¯cantly improves the empirical performance of the model using the Gregory-Hansen
test for cointegration in the presence of a possible structural break in the cointegrating
relationship. Our results imply that allowing for time varying model parameters in this
way does not overturn the conclusion that the time inconsistency framework does not ¯t
the data for most OECD countries.
An important variant of the KPBG story is the widespread view that policy makers
targeted unattainable unemployment rates in the 1960s and 1970s, but, perhaps due to
advances in economic theory, became more cautious about trying to use monetary policy
to o®set high unemployment rates in more recent decades.3 If correct, this variant of the
theory implies that in°ation and unemployment should be cointegrated in the ¯rst part
of the sample, when policy makers were still treating the Phillips curve as an exploitable
relationship. In the latter portion of the sample, when policy makers learn not to target
unemployment rates below the NAIRU, the time inconsistency model no longer describes
the behavior of central bankers, so in°ation and unemployment ought not to be related at
all.
We test this variant of the basic KPBG model by re-estimating the model using only
data from the ¯rst part of the sample. Essentially, we ask whether this hypothesis is a
reasonable explanation of the rise in in°ation in the 1960s and 1970s. Surprisingly, given
the prevalence of this hypothesis amongst macroeconomists, the time inconsistency account
¯ts no better when estimated just on data from the 1960s and 1970s than it does on data
over the whole sample. The main problem is that the theory can only deliver rising in°ation
in the presence of increases in the NAIRU, but, outside of the U.S., there is little evidence
of a rising NAIRU during the period of rising in°ation. We conclude that this variant of
the theory ¯nds no more support than the baseline model.
A ¯nal variant on the basic framework allows that in°ation may have spilled over from
the U.S. to other countries, due to a dislike on the part of monetary authorities in smaller
countries of large nominal exchange rate movements with respect to the U.S. In this case,
an increase in the U.S. NAIRU drives up U.S. in°ation, which forces foreign monetary
authorities to allow domestic in°ation to rise, so as to avoid an appreciation of the domestic
currency. We extend the baseline model to incorporate exchange rate targeting, and show
that U.S. unemployment rates enter as an additional cointegrating variable into the smaller
country's in°ation and unemployment relationship.
might have altered some of the underlying parameters of a baseline time-consistency model. Some of the
main possibilities are openness, average in°ation, and central bank independence.
3Sargent (1999) refers to this account of the rise and fall in in°ation as the \the triumph of natural-rate
theory" view.
3We test for cointegration between domestic in°ation, and domestic and U.S. unemploy-
ment. The results do suggest that there is a cointegrating relationship, with a positive sign,
between domestic in°ation and U.S. unemployment in two thirds of the OECD countries
in our sample. The evidence, however, suggests that time inconsistency and in°ationary
bias have not been important determinants of monetary policy in other OECD countries, as
trends in domestic unemployment seem to be unrelated to one another. Thus, the evidence
is consistent with an account in which time inconsistency problems in U.S. monetary policy
caused in°ation in the U.S. to rise in the 1960s and 1970s, and that this in°ation spilled
over into other OECD countries via exchange rates. The behavior of foreign monetary au-
thorities with respect to their domestic unemployment rates, however, is not well described
by the KPBG model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a typical model of time-consistent
monetary policy with a time varying NAIRU as well as extensions of the model incorpo-
rating both time varying model parameters, and international spillovers in in°ation. In
Section 3 we present the results of our econometric tests of the long run restrictions of the
baseline model. We also present the results of tests incorporating both structural breaks
and international spillovers into the baseline framework. In Section 4 we o®er concluding
remarks.
2 A Time-Consistency Model of Monetary Policy
In this section we present a version of the simple KPBG time-consistency model of
monetary policy in which a central banker, lacking the ability to commit to an optimal
policy rule, is tempted to reduce unemployment in each period by engineering surprise
in°ation. Private agents in the model have rational expectations, however, and understand
that the central banker faces this temptation. They adjust their in°ationary expectations
accordingly and are not surprised by the central bank's in°ationary policies. The result is
an equilibrium outcome with ine±ciently high in°ation, but unemployment no lower than
it would have been had the policy maker been able to commit to not attempting to in°ate.
Following Ireland (1999), our version of the simple KPBG model is extended to allow
for a time varying NAIRU. We assume that the NAIRU possesses a unit root in order to
allow the model to replicate the unit root behavior of in°ation and unemployment that
we document in the empirical section of the paper. The model itself makes no predictions
regarding the time series properties of the NAIRU, treating it as exogenous. The testable
predictions of the model concern the impact of exogenous changes in the NAIRU on in°ation.
In particular, the in°ationary bias and consequently equilibrium in°ation depend directly
on the NAIRU, implying that equilibrium in°ation and the NAIRU are cointegrated.
In Section 2.2 we extend the model to allow for the possibility that unobserved pa-
rameters change over the course of the sample. We show that parameter shifts cause the
cointegrating vector between in°ation and unemployment to change over time. In Section
2.3 we incorporate an exchange rate targeting central bank into the analysis, and show that
4this implies international in°ation spillovers. The testable implication we draw from this is
the result that, in the open economy version of the model, a country's domestic in°ation
rate, domestic unemployment rate and the U.S. unemployment rate are cointegrated.
2.1 A Baseline Model
The standard time-consistency model of monetary policy begins with an equation de-
scribing the relationship between unemployment and in°ation, which acts as a constraint
on policy makers trying to a®ect in°ation and unemployment outcomes. This structural
relationship is generally modelled as an expectations augmented short run Phillips curve:
ut = un
t ¡ ®(¼t ¡ ¼e
t); (2.1)
where ¼t is the rate of in°ation in period t, ¼e
t represents household's expectations of period
t in°ation, ut is the rate of unemployment, and un
t is the NAIRU.
The policy maker in the model is assumed to have preferences over unemployment and
in°ation outcomes in the economy. These preferences take the form of a loss function, which
the policy maker wishes to minimize:
L(¼t;ut) = 1=2 [ b ¢ ¼2
t + (ut ¡ k ¢ un
t )2 ]; (2.2)
where b represents the central bank's distaste for in°ation and k ¢ un
t represents the central
bank's target level of unemployment.4 It is generally assumed that k < 1. In such a case,
the central bank wishes to target an unemployment rate below the NAIRU{this leads to
the in°ationary bias which is at the heart of the time inconsistency story.
The problem facing the policy maker is to minimize:
Et¡1L(¼t;ut:) (2.3)
The policy maker is unable to commit to a monetary policy rule. Instead, in each period,
after the private agents have formed their expectations but before the realization of ²t, the
policy maker chooses a target rate of in°ation ¼
p
t. Actual in°ation in the period is then
determined as the sum of the policy maker's in°ation target, plus some control error ´t:
¼t = ¼
p
t + ´t; (2.4)
where ´t is a serially uncorrelated random variable with mean zero and standard deviation
¾´. The assumption that the central banker controls in°ation only imperfectly mainly serves
to break the link between the actual unemployment rate and the NAIRU, allowing us to
avoid the necessity of identifying all changes in unemployment with changes in the NAIRU.
The policy maker selects ¼
p
t in order to minimize the loss function given by (2.2), subject




t + ´t) = ®Et¡1[(1 ¡ k)un
t ¡ ®(¼
p
t + ´t ¡ ¼e
t)]: (2.5)
4We could also assume that the central bank targets the deviation of in°ation from some optimal level
¼
¤
t . Here we have just assumed ¼
¤
t = 0 for all t.
5Agents have rational expectations, so that ¼e
t = ¼
p
t. This, along with the fact the











Equation (2.6) exhibits a key feature of the model: the equilibrium rate of in°ation
depends directly on the expected value of the NAIRU. This is due to the fact that the
central banker's desired target level of unemployment is proportional to the NAIRU. As a
result, when the NAIRU is higher, the central banker faces a greater temptation to try to
in°ate the problem away. Loosely, the in°ationary bias is more severe at higher levels of
the NAIRU, implying that in°ation will be higher in periods when the NAIRU is high. As
usual, rational expectations imply that this has no e®ect on the actual unemployment rate.
A simple version of the model, with a constant NAIRU, implies that both in°ation and
unemployment are constant. In order to enable the model to speak to trends in in°ation, we




t¡1 + ²t; (2.7)
where ²t is a serially uncorrelated random variable with mean zero and standard deviation
¾². The assumption that the NAIRU is exogenous can be interpreted simply to mean that
the NAIRU is una®ected by monetary policy, and is therefore taken as given by the central
banker.
Equations (2.1), (2.4), and (2.6) imply that:
ut = un
t ¡ ®´t: (2.8)
Essentially, Equation (2.8) shows how the control error implies that the actual unemploy-
ment rate °uctuates around the NAIRU in equilibrium.
Combining (2.8) with (2.7) yields:
ut = un
t¡1 + ´t: (2.9)
Equation (2.9) describes the equilibrium evolution of unemployment. It shows that equilib-
rium unemployment depends only on the underlying process for the NAIRU and the control
error, which creates unpredictable in°ation.
We can derive a similar relationship for equilibrium in°ation. Equations (2.7), (2.4),







t¡1 + ²t ¡ ®´t: (2.10)









t¡2) + ²t, where 1 > ¸ > ¡1. We adopt the simpler unit root process
given above for convenience. The essential features of the model are unchanged if we use the more realistic
process for the NAIRU instead.
6Again, equilibrium in°ation depends only on the underlying process for the NAIRU and the
control error. Observe that the extent to which in°ation varies with the NAIRU depends on
the preferences of the central banker. In particular, if k were equal to 1, the central banker
would target the NAIRU and there would be no in°ationary bias. In this case, in°ation
would depend only on the unpredictable shocks, ²t and ´t and would have no trend. Any
trend in in°ation generated by the model is driven by trends in the underlying NAIRU
process.
Separately, Equations (2.9) and (2.10) show how in°ation and unemployment inherit



















Both in°ation and unemployment depend directly on the NAIRU. Any trend displayed
by either of these variables in equilibrium is inherited from the underlying NAIRU. Although
in°ation and unemployment are non-stationary when the NAIRU is non-stationary, a linear
combination of these two variables is stationary. In other words, the KPBG model implies
that in°ation and unemployment should be cointegrated if the NAIRU follows a unit root.
It is this implication of the model that we test empirically in Section 3.
2.2 Extension: Structural Breaks
Tests of the model based on Equation (2.11) rely on the maintained hypothesis that the
parameters of the model do not change over time. There are three parameters in the
baseline model, each of which may have changed over the past few decades: i) ®, which
represents the slope of the short run Phillips curve, ii) k, which represents the extent to
which the central banker wants to push unemployment below the natural rate, and iii)
b, which represents the relative importance of in°ation versus unemployment deviations
from target. In our empirical section, we would like to allow for the possibility that these
parameters are not constant throughout the sample. In this section we present a model in
which these parameters are permitted to change over time in order to examine how this
changes the testable implications of the model.
We begin with the short run Phillips curve, which is now given by:
ut = un
t ¡ ®t(¼t ¡ ¼e
t): (2.12)
This di®ers from the previous speci¯cation only in that ®t is allowed to vary over time.
The policy maker's loss function is now given by:
L(¼t;ut) = 1=2 [ bt ¢ ¼2
t + (ut ¡ kt ¢ un)2 ]: (2.13)
Again, the di®erence is that bt and kt are permitted to change over time. We maintain
the assumptions on the control error and the process of the NAIRU, which are given by
Equations (2.4) and (2.7) respectively.
7As was previously the case, the policy maker selects ¼
p
t in order to minimize the loss
function given by (2.13) subject to the expectations augmented Phillips curve given by
















Since the policy maker chooses ¼
p
t at the start of the period, ¼
p
t is known. Since ´
is mean zero and i.i.d Et¡1(bt´t) = Et¡1(®2
t´t) = 0. After applying the usual Rational
Expectations assumption that ¼e
t = ¼
p








While Equation (2.15) is fairly general, it is not particularly useful. In order to get
something more manageable it is necessary to put some structure on the processes gener-
ating ®t, bt and kt. There are essentially two broad classes of possibilities: i) the date t
realizations of these variables are known before the policy maker chooses ¼
p
t, and ii) the
date t realizations are not known to the policy maker when choosing ¼
p
t.
The ¯rst case is much simpler and we will focus exclusively on this case in the discussion
here.6 The policy maker has to pick ¼
p
t at the beginning of each period t. This means that,
even if ®t, bt and kt follow stochastic processes, as long as the date t realizations are known
before the policy maker chooses ¼
p
t, we don't have to worry about taking expectations of





























This is essentially Equation (2.11), except that ®t, bt, and kt are allowed to vary over time.
This implies that there may not be a time invariant cointegrating vector between in°ation
and unemployment. It is clear from Equation (2.17) that changes in the parameters of the
model would cause the cointegrating vector to change over time. We will incorporate this
possibility into our empirical work by allowing for structural breaks in the cointegrating
vector.
6The second case is more complicated, for two reasons. First, it makes the discussion of cointegration
more complicated because ¼t will depend on expectations of ®t, bt and kt where ut will depend on the
realizations. Second, modelling these parameters as uncertain at date t requires speci¯cation of the joint
process of u
n
t along with ®t, bt and kt, in order to be able to calculate any covariances that arise.
82.3 Extension: Open Economies
In this section we extend the model to allow for the possibility that in°ation in one
country is transmitted to another country via the e®ect on exchange rates by assuming that
central bankers target changes in nominal exchange rates in addition to domestic in°ation
and unemployment. The model is meant to capture the case of a small economy that
unilaterally targets the domestic-U.S. nominal exchange rate.
The domestic monetary authority faces the usual problem of choosing planned in°ation
(Equation 2.4) to minimize a loss function subject to an expectations augmented Phillips
curve (Equation 2.1) taking household expectations as given. As before, we assume that
the NAIRU follows a simple unit root process (Equation 2.7).
However, in addition to targeting domestic in°ation and unemployment, the policy
maker also wants to minimize nominal exchange rate movements. Hence, the loss function
becomes:
L(¼t;ut;¢et) = 1=2[b ¢ ¼2
t + (ut ¡ k ¢ un
t )2 + Á(¢et)2]; (2.18)
where ¢et is the change in the log of the nominal exchange rate.
We assume that a simple PPP theory describes exchange rates, so that et = pt ¡ p
f
t ,
where pt is the log of the domestic price level, and p
f
t is the log of the foreign price level.
This implies that:
¢et = ¼t ¡ ¼
f
t : (2.19)
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(1 ¡ k) ¢ un
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p





















t g = 0: (2.21)
Using Et¡1´t = 0, and imposing rational expectations (¼
p
t = ¼e














Equilibrium unemployment is given by:
ut = un
t + ²t: (2.23)
In order to complete the model, we need to specify the process by which ¼
f
t is generated,
which requires a model of the foreign economy. We make the assumption that the foreign
country doesn't target the exchange rate, so foreign in°ation is determined by the baseline

























































Relative to the baseline model, when the foreign government decides to try to minimize
exchange rate movements, it is forced to keep domestic in°ation in line with foreign in°ation.
This implies that changes in the NAIRU of the foreign country, which imply changes in the
foreign in°ation and unemployment rates, also cause changes in the domestic in°ation rate.
The result is that domestic in°ation, domestic unemployment, and foreign unemployment
are cointegrated in this version of the model. The restrictions on the model parameters




(b+Á)bf should be positive. Consequently, when
the coe±cient on domestic in°ation is normalized to unity the coe±cients on domestic and
foreign unemployment in the cointegrating vector should be negative.
3 Testing the Model's Implications
In this section we examine the data from a number of OECD economies to see if in°ation
and unemployment move together as predicted by the theory.
3.1 The Data
We employ quarterly data from a number of OECD countries. Our variables are the
civilian unemployment rate (as reported in the OECD's Main Economic Indicators) and
the rate of in°ation, measured alternately by the quarterly percentage change in the GDP
de°ator (taken from the IFS database) and in the Consumer Price Index (again taken from
the MEI). We end up with a sample of 13 countries for which su±cient time series data are
available at quarterly frequencies.7
Given that we wish to explain the pattern of in°ation outcomes over a long period
of time, we include only those countries for which data goes back until the early 1970s.
We exclude countries for which the data starts later than this because in°ation has fallen
steadily since the mid to late 1970s, and we want to ensure that the model is capable of
explaining both the rise and fall of OECD in°ation. Due to data availability issues, we use
di®erent samples for each country. Also, data limitations with regard to in°ation measured
by the GDP de°ator led us to use this measure only for the G-7 countries. The samples
used are described in Tables 1 and 2.
7Our sample consists of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Norway, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S..
10Figures 1 through 7 plot the in°ation (measured as the annual percentage change in the
GDP de°ator) and unemployment rates of the G-7 economies, along with a 7-year centered
moving average to highlight the longer run trends in each series. A visual inspection of
these ¯gures allows us to anticipate the main results of the paper. Figure 1 echoes Ireland's
results. Both in°ation and unemployment rise steadily until the early 1980s and both decline
fairly steadily thereafter.
A quick look at the remaining ¯gures, however, suggests that the U.S. is an outlier in this
regard. For Japan and the Western European countries (excluding the U.K), in°ation and
unemployment exhibit very di®erent trends. While in°ation follows the usual rising-then-
falling pattern, unemployment rates trend steadily upwards throughout the sample (until
at least the late 1990s). If the time inconsistency hypothesis is correct, in°ation ought to
have continued rising in these economies during the 1980s and 1990s.
The plots for the U.K. and Canada are not quite as clear. In both of these countries,
unemployment does exhibit a rise and then fall over the course of the sample. However, the
timing of this rise and fall appears to be unfavorable to the time inconsistency hypothesis. In
both countries, the largest increase in unemployment is accompanied by declining in°ation.
The time inconsistency hypothesis suggests that the rise of in°ation ought to have occurred
starting in the mid 1970s in these countries{this is the very time in°ation rates were in fact
beginning to decline again.
The next section provides a more detailed analysis, using the model of the previous
section as the basis for statistical tests of the hypothesis that time inconsistency problems
can explain the observed trends in OECD in°ation rates.
3.2 Testing for Cointegration
Equations (2.9) and (2.10) state that, according to the model, both the unemployment
rate and in°ation rate ought to be unit root processes. Unit root test results are reported
in Tables 1 and 2. The test we applied was the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, de-meaning
the data ¯rst by GLS and then using Ng and Perron's (2001) Modi¯ed AIC to select the
number of lagged di®erences to include in the ADF regression.8 This test seems to have
relatively good size and power properties for series like unemployment and in°ation, which
tend to have a large negative moving-average root.
Table 1 reports the test results for matched sample periods of the unemployment rate
and the CPI-based in°ation rate for the 13 OECD countries that form our large sample.
Table 2 reports the test results for matched sample periods of the unemployment rate and
the GDP De°ator-based in°ation rate for the subset of G-7 countries. In no case was
it possible to reject the null hypothesis that the series possesses a unit root at the 5%
signi¯cance level. We can reject the null at a 10% level for the in°ation rate in the U.K and
the unemployment rate in the U.S. We also reject the null at a 10% level of signi¯cance for
the in°ation rate in Italy when we use the GDP de°ator as our measure of prices. Based
8This is the test statistic described in Ng and Perron (2001) with p = 0 and ¹ c = ¡7:0.
11on the results of Tables 1 and 2, it seems reasonable to treat both the unemployment rate
and the in°ation rate as unit root processes across all countries and proceed to test for
cointegration.
We begin our estimation by verifying econometrically the observation that the time series
pattern of in°ation outcomes over the past four decades has been similar across the countries
in our sample. We do this by applying Johansen's (1988) maximum likelihood approach
to test for cointegration between a country's in°ation rate and the U.S. in°ation rate. As
Table 3 shows, the long-run trends in in°ation rates are very similar across countries. The
null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at standard signi¯cance levels for all countries
in our sample except Austria and Japan. 9 10 These results suggest that trends in in°ation
in di®erent countries are related. This is an important observation as it suggests there may
be a common explanation of in°ation trends in OECD countries.
With these results in hand, we turn to our empirical implementation of the simple
model of Section 2.1, applying Johansen's (1988) maximum likelihood approach to test for
cointegration between unemployment and in°ation rates. The results for the unemployment
rate and the CPI in°ation rate are reported in Table 4 for the full set of OECD countries.
The results for the unemployment rate and the GDP de°ator in°ation rate are reported in
Table 5 for the G-7 countries.
The ¯rst thing to note is that the null hypothesis that in°ation and unemployment are
not cointegrated is rejected at the 5-percent level for the U.S., whether we use the CPI
in°ation rate or the GDP de°ator in°ation rate. In this sense our results mirror those of
Ireland (1999). However, our results di®er from his once we look at other countries in our
sample. The null of no cointegration between the unemployment rate and the CPI in°ation
rate cannot be rejected at the 5-percent level for any of the 13 OECD countries other than
the U.S. It can be rejected at the 10-percent level only for the U.S. and Canada.
The null of no cointegration between the unemployment rate and the GDP de°ator
in°ation can is rejected at the 1-percent level for Italy, at the 5-percent level for the U.S.
and at the 10-percent level for France. It is not rejected at the 10-percent level for the other
four G-7 countries.
These results suggest that simple time inconsistency models of in°ation do not provide
an adequate explanation for the pattern of rising and then falling in°ation rates observed
in OECD economies over the past four decades. In subsequent sections we explore the
possibility that extensions of the baseline model provide a better explanation of the data.
9The result for Japan is sensitive to the starting date. If we look for cointegration over the years 1974-
2003, we reject the hypothesis of no cointegration between U.S. and Japanese in°ation at a 1% signi¯cant
level.
10In the bivariate setting with both series assumed to be unit root processes, Johansen's ¸-max and ¸-trace
tests are equivalent, since in both cases the null hypothesis is that the cointegration rank is zero and the
alternative hypothesis is that the cointegration rank is one.
123.3 Time Varying Parameters
The model we have tested so far is a simple version of the story and our test is a joint
test of the mechanism described by the model and a number of other assumptions. Perhaps
the most signi¯cant of these is the assumption that those aspects of the economy captured
by the various parameters of the model (the degree of in°ationary bias of central bankers,
the slope of the short run Phillips curve, etc ...) have remained constant over the relevant
time horizon. There are reasons to think that this assumption is incorrect.
A number of authors in the literature have investigated the possibility that the slope
of the short run Phillips curve, ®, has shifted in recent decades due to factors such as
increased openness (Romer (1993), Campillo & Miron (1997), Lane (1997), and Temple
(2002)) or changes in average in°ation rates (Lucas (1972), Ball, Mankiw & Romer (1989)
and Akerlof, Dickens & Perry (1996)). Alternately, it has been suggested that the central
banker's preference parameters, kt and bt, may have shifted, perhaps due to increases in
central bank independence (Alesina & Summers (1993), Campillo & Miron (1997), Temple
(1998) and Brumm (2000)). These factors, and others like them, represent potential sources
of parameter changes that might a®ect the cointegrating vector given by (2.17).
We incorporate the possibility of parameter change into our empirical work by allowing
for structural breaks in the cointegrating relationship between in°ation and unemployment.
The Johansen test for cointegration, like conventional residual-based cointegration tests,
tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration with
a ¯xed level and slope of the cointegration relationship. If in°ation and unemployment
are cointegrated but the level and/or slope parameter changes over the course of the sam-
ple, then the test will have poor power. In particular, the failure to account for regime
shifts in the cointegrating relationship may explain why we did not ¯nd more evidence of
cointegration between in°ation and unemployment.
We applied Gregory & Hansen's (1996) residual-based test for cointegration, which al-
lows for the possibility of a regime shift under the alternative of cointegration, although
the timing of the regime shift is not known. The null hypothesis is that the series are not
cointegrated. The particular version of the Gregory-Hansen test we applied 1) used their
ADF* statistic, 2) applied to the residuals from their \regime shift" or \C/S" cointegrating
regression, which allows for a change in the intercept and/or slope coe±cient, and 3) re-
stricting the possible break point to lie within the middle 70-percent of the sample period.
Following Gregory and Hansen, the lag lengths for the ADF-regressions were selected by
choosing the smallest lag length for which the t-statistic on the last lag included was less
than two in absolute value, with the maximum lag length being equal to eight. Asymptotic
critical values were obtained from Table 1 in Gregory and Hansen (1996) using the row m =
1, ADF*, C/S. Note that Monte Carlo simulations by Gregory and Hansen (1996) indicate
that the actual size of the test in ¯nite sample applications tends to be larger than the
nominal size implied by the asymptotic critical values.
The results are reported in Tables 6 and 7, which di®er according to whether the in°ation
13rate is calculated from the CPI or the GDP de°ator, respectively. According to Table 6,
there is some evidence that Denmark and Norway can be added to the set of countries (i.e.,
the U.S. and Canada) for which CPI-based in°ation rate and the unemployment rate are
cointegrated. The results from Table 7 do not provide any additional countries for which
the GDP-de°ator based in°ation rate and the unemployment rate are cointegrated. In fact
these results provide weaker evidence for cointegration of unemployment and the GDP-
de°ator based in°ation rate than was the case in the previous section where we ignored the
possibility of structural breaks.
3.4 The Triumph of Natural-Rate Theory?
In this section we examine the possibility that in°ation and unemployment are cointe-
grated over the ¯rst part of the sample, but not the rest.11 This case is of particular interest
as it corresponds to a commonly held view amongst macroeconomists: in the 1960s and
early 1970s central bankers attempted to maintain low unemployment rates by trying to
exploit the observed Phillips curve relationship, but due to re¯nements in economic theory
today's central bankers understand that there exists a `natural' rate of unemployment and
do not attempt to push unemployment below this sustainable level. The result of these
advances has been an elimination of in°ationary bias and time inconsistency problems in
monetary policy.
The case where there is no in°ationary bias corresponds, in the model, to the case where
k takes the value 1. Inspection of Equation (2.17) shows that the implication of k = 1 is
that in°ation and unemployment are no longer cointegrated. In the absence of in°ationary
bias, the unemployment rate would still follow the NAIRU but the policy maker would not
be tempted to try to in°ate away this employment with surprise in°ation. The in°ation
rate would hover around the policy makers target, deviating from the target only as a result
of the control error.
To test the possibility that there is an in°ationary bias in the ¯rst but not latter part
of the sample, we applied the Johansen cointegration test to the ¯rst half of the sample
for each country and also to the ¯rst two thirds of the sample for each country. We would
expect to reject the no cointegration null more often than we did for the full sample if the
story that the KPBG model applies only to the ¯rst part of the sample is correct.
According to the results, presented in Table 8, there is little evidence that in°ation and
unemployment are cointegrated in the earlier portion of the sample period. This hypothesis
is rejected, in favor of the null of no cointegration, in all but one instance. These results
suggest that the empirical shortcomings of the model documented in the previous sections
are not just due to problems ¯tting the data at the end of the sample, where one might
expect issues related to time inconsistency to play a smaller role in monetary policy. In fact
the model also fails to ¯t the data well even in the earlier period, where the existence of an
11This is just an extreme example of changing parameters discussed in the previous section, in which the
in°ationary bias vanishes because k becomes equal to 1. However, this hypothesis is not covered by the tests
we reported in the previous section.
14in°ationary bias is more plausible.
3.5 Open Economy Spillovers
We have seen that while the time inconsistency model ¯ts the U.S. data, it does not do a
very good job at explaining in°ation in other countries. In this section, we test the version
of the model presented in Section 2.3, in which in°ationary pressures generated by a rising
U.S. NAIRU spill over into the other OECD economies as a result of monetary authorities'
attempts to manage nominal exchange rate movements of their domestic currencies vis a
vis the U.S. dollar.
The implication of this model is that domestic in°ation, domestic unemployment, and
U.S. unemployment should be cointegrated. According to the results presented in Table 9,
these three variables do appear to be cointegrated in many countries. Column 1 presents
the Johansen trace statistic for the null hypothesis that there are no cointegrating vectors
for domestic in°ation, domestic unemployment, and U.S. unemployment in the twelve non-
U.S. countries in our sample. The null of no cointegrating vectors is rejected at the 10%
level in 8 countries, and at the 5% level or greater in 6 of the 12 countries.12
One potential concern regarding these results is the possibility that the presence of
cointegration is due to cointegration between domestic and U.S. unemployment rates, while
the coe±cient on domestic in°ation in the cointegrating vector is zero. We check whether
this is the case by applying the ADF residual based test for cointegration, for which the
coe±cient on domestic in°ation is normalized to one. A rejection of the null hypothesis
of no cointegration, using this test implies that the coe±cient on domestic in°ation in the
cointegrating vector cannot be zero. Column 2 of Table 9 presents the results, which echo
the results of the Johansen test in rejecting the null of no cointegration for most countries.
A secondary concern is whether all three variables are cointegrated, or whether the
result of cointegration is just due to cointegration between domestic in°ation and U.S.
unemployment (i.e. is the coe±cient on domestic unemployment in the cointegrating vector
equal to zero). A ¯nding of a zero coe±cient on domestic in°ation in a country does not
invalidate the model, but implies that one of two special cases must hold: either i) domestic
unemployment does not enter the central bank's loss function (i.e. b = 0) for that country,
or ii) the central banker in that country does not su®er from in°ationary bias in that country
(i.e. k = 1).
We can test whether the coe±cient on domestic unemployment is zero by testing to
see whether or not domestic in°ation and U.S. unemployment are cointegrated in countries
for which there is evidence of cointegration in the three variable model: if there is cointe-
gration between all three variables, but also cointegration between domestic in°ation and
U.S. unemployment, then the coe±cient on domestic unemployment in the cointegrating
12Three of the countries for which there is no evidence of cointegration between these three variables are
Germany, Japan, and the UK. It is perhaps not surprising that the model doesn't ¯t for these countries,
given the stature of their currencies and the fact that the small open economy assumption on which the
model is based is perhaps less applicable.
15vector in the three variable case has to be zero. If there are two I(1) variables (¼d, and
uU:S:) for which a linear combination is stationary, adding a third I(1) variable (ud) to this
stationary combination, the resulting term will not be I(0) except in the special case where
the coe±cient on the third I(1) term is zero.
Conversely, if there is cointegration between all three variables, and no cointegration
between domestic in°ation and U.S. unemployment, then the coe±cient on domestic un-
employment in the cointegrating variable cannot be zero. In this case, a linear combination
of three I(1) variables (¼d, ud, and uU:S:) is stationary. If no linear combination of ¼d and
uU:S: is stationary, then it cannot be the case that the coe±cient on ud in the three vari-
able cointegrating vector is zero (because adding zero to a combination of variables that is
non-stationary cannot produce a stationary variable).13
Columns 3 and 4 of table 9 present the results of Johansen and ADF tests of the
null hypothesis that domestic in°ation and U.S. unemployment are not cointegrated. The
Johansen test rejects the null of no cointegration in 9 out of 12 cases, and in 8 of the 9
countries for which the Johansen test rejected the null of no cointegration in the tri-variate
model. The results of the ADF test are somewhat less supportive of the notion that domestic
in°ation and U.S. unemployment are cointegrated, rejecting the null of no cointegration in
6 of 12 countries.14 Overall, the results of columns 3 and 4 provide some evidence that the
coe±cient on domestic unemployment is zero.15 16
The results presented in this section provide some support for the view that the KPBG
model, extended to allow for international in°ation spillovers, is consistent with OECD
in°ation trends. However, the evidence suggests that the coe±cient on domestic unemploy-
ment may be equal to zero. In words, the results are consistent with the following version of
the time inconsistency hypothesis: time inconsistency and in°ationary bias were important
components of monetary policy in the U.S., but not in other OECD countries. The common
trend in OECD in°ation rates was fundamentally driven by the trend in the NAIRU in the
13Note that this logic implies that the coe±cient on U.S. in°ation cannot be zero, as the results of previous
sections established that domestic in°ation and domestic unemployment are not cointegrated in the countries
in our data set.
14The discrepancy between the two sets of results may be due to the Johansen test having more power
than the residual based test, though power comparisons have yielded mixed results (See Boswijk & Frances
(1992), Haug (1996), and Pesavanto (2004)).
15Our test of a zero coe±cient on domestic unemployment assumes that there is a unique (up to a scalar
multiple) cointegrating vector between domestic in°ation, domestic unemployment, and foreign unemploy-
ment. If there are multiple cointegrating vectors, a ¯nding of a zero coe±cient on domestic unemployment
would apply only to one of these cointegrating vectors. A Johansen test of null hypothesis of one or fewer
cointegrating vectors rejects the null in favor of multiple cointegrating vectors at the 5% level in only two
countries: Australia and Italy. Only one of these countries (Italy) is among the countries for which both a)
domestic in°ation, domestic unemployment, and foreign unemployment are cointegrated, and b) domestic
in°ation and foreign unemployment are cointegrated.
16Of note, we estimated the cointegrating vector using OLS and found that, while the coe±cients on
U.S. unemployment were uniformly negative across the sample, coe±cients on domestic unemployment
were uniformly positive. The open economy version of the KPBG model we presented implies that these
coe±cients must be non-positive, where the coe±cient on domestic in°ation equals zero only in the special
cases described above.
16U.S., which drove trend in°ation in the U.S.. The trend in U.S. in°ation in turn spilled
over into other OECD countries via the exchange rate.
4 Concluding Remarks
In°ation outcomes in many OECD economies have followed a similar pattern over the
past forty years. It is reasonable to look for a common explanation of this common trend.
The KPBG model of in°ationary bias and time inconsistency problems provides a natural
starting point. The mechanisms at the heart of this model ought to apply to the conduct
of monetary policy in most OECD countries, and in previous work the model has been
shown to have had some success explaining the in°ationary experience of the U.S. over this
period. In this paper, we have shown that a simple time-consistency story does not provide
an adequate explanation for the pattern of rising and then falling in°ation rates observed
in OECD economies over the past 4 decades.
We examined some plausible reasons why the simple model may be inadequate, focusing
¯rst on the possibility that unobserved parameters of the baseline model may have shifted
over the sample period. Expanding our empirical work to allow for the possibility of regimes
shifts in the cointegrating relationship did not appear to improve the ability of the model
to explain long run in°ation trends. The widely held hypothesis that time inconsistency
was historically an important feature of monetary policy making that is no longer relevant
does not seem to be a solution to the empirical shortcomings of the baseline model.
While there is little evidence that cointegration between the in°ation rate and the un-
employment rate is widespread across OECD countries, U.S. in°ation and unemployment
in the U.S. do appear to be cointegrated. There is some support for the view that time
inconsistency problems in the U.S. drove U.S. in°ation, which then spilled over into other
OECD countries' in°ation rates, even though time inconsistency and in°ationary bias were
not important drivers of monetary policy in the rest of the OECD. Whether re¯nements of
this hypothesis can explain whether and why time inconsistency problems a®ected mone-
tary policy in the U.S. but not in other OECD countries, or whether a complete explanation
for the common trend in OECD in°ation rates lies outside the KPBG time inconsistency
framework remains a question for future research.
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19Table 1. Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Tests: CPI In°ation and Unemployment
Country Sample ¼ u
Australia 1966:3-2003:3 -1.56 -0.55
Austria 1964:1-2003:3 -1.11 0.28
Canada 1964:1-2003:3 -1.55 -0.75
Denmark 1970:1-2003:3 -0.79 -0.77
Finland 1964:1-2003:3 -1.01 -0.55
France 1967:4-2003:3 -1.10 -0.13
Germany 1964:1-2003:3 -1.34 -0.40
Italy 1964:1-2003:3 -1.39 -0.29
Japan 1964:1-2003:3 -0.94 0.69
Norway 1964:1-2002:2 -1.26 -0.94
Sweden 1970:1-2003:3 -1.18 -1.01
United Kingdom 1964:1-2003:3 -1.66 * -1.29
United States 1964:1-2003:3 -0.93 -1.78 *
The test statistic is the test statistic in Ng and Perron (2001). Asymptotic critical values
for the statistic are: -1.62 (10%), -1.98 (5%), -2.58 (1%).
H0: The series possesses a unit root.
* = reject at the 10-percent level
20Table 2. GDP De°ator In°ation and Unemployment (G-7)
Country Sample ¼ u
Canada 1964:1-2003:3 -1.59 -0.75
France 1970:2-1998:4 -0.86 -0.18
Germany 1964:1-2002:4 -1.08 -0.40
Italy 1964:1-2003:3 -1.67* -0.29
Japan 1964:1-1999:4 -1.30 1.01
United Kingdom 1964:1-1998:4 -1.66* -1.21
United States 1964:1-2003:3 -1.46 -1.78 *
The test statistic is the test statistic in Ng and Perron (2001). Asymptotic critical values
for the statistic are: -1.62 (10%), -1.98 (5%), -2.58 (1%).
H0: The series possesses a unit root.
* = reject at the 10-percent level














The sample period is 1964:1-2003:3, except for Denmark, which is 1967:1-2003:3.
The test statistic is the Johansen ¸-max (= ¸-trace in the present setting) test statistic for
testing the null of no-cointegration. An 8-lag VECM was used to compute the statistic.
Asymptotic critical values for the statistic are: 12.78 (10%), 14.60 (5%), 18.78 (1%).
* = reject at the 10-percent level
** = reject at the 5-percent level
*** = reject at the 1-percent level













United Kingdom 1964:1-2003:3 5.15
United States 1964:1-2003:3 15.15**
The test statistic is the Johansen ¸-max (= ¸-trace in the present setting) test statistic for
testing the null of no-cointegration. An 8-lag VECM was used to compute the statistic.
Asymptotic critical values for the statistic are: 12.78 (10%), 14.60 (5%), 18.78 (1%).
* = reject at the 10-percent level
** = reject at the 5-percent level







United Kingdom 1964:1-1998:4 5.92
United States 1964:1-2003:3 16.31**
The test statistic is the Johansen ¸-max (= ¸-trace in the present setting) test statistic for
testing the null of no-cointegration. An 8-lag VECM was used to compute the statistic.
Asymptotic critical values for the statistic are: 12.78 (10%), 14.60 (5%), 18.78 (1%).
* = reject at the 10-percent level
** = reject at the 5-percent level
24Table 6. Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test: CPI In°ation Rate and Unemployment Rate
Country Sample Unemployment Rate In°ation Rate
ADF*-Statistic ADF*-Statistic
Australia 1966:3-2003:3 -2.69 -3.39
Austria 1964:1-2003:3 -2.77 -4.62
Canada 1964:1-2003:3 -4.29 -3.66
Denmark 1970:1-2003:3 -3.18 -4.81*
Finland 1964:1-2003:3 -3.00 -2.76
France 1967:4-2003:3 -3.08 -3.26
Germany 1964:1-2003:3 -4.04 -2.96
Italy 1964:1-2003:3 -2.30 -2.67
Japan 1964:1-2003:3 -2.61 -4.54
Norway 1964:1-2002:2 -3.15 -4.79*
Sweden 1970:1-2003:3 -2.54 -4.10
United Kingdom 1964:1-2003:3 -2.88* -3.73
United States 1964:1-2003:3 -3.43 -4.21*
The test statistic is the ADF* statistic in Gregory-Hansen (1996). The null hypothesis is
that the unemployment and in°ation rates are not cointegrated. The alternative
hypothesis is that they are cointegrated with a possible break in the intercept and slope of
the cointegrating regression. The asymptotic critical values (from Gregory-Hansen, Table
1, m = 1, C/S) are: -4.68 (10%), -4.95 (5%), -5.47 (1%).
* = reject at the 10-percent level
** = reject at the 5-percent level
*** = reject at the 1-percent level
25Table 7. GDP De°ator In°ation and Unemployment (G-7)
Country Sample Unemployment Rate In°ation Rate
ADF*-Statistic ADF*-Statistic
Canada 1964:1-2003:3 -4.43 -3.89
France 1970:2-1998:4 -3.99 -2.63
Germany 1964:1-2002:4 -3.93 -4.25
Italy 1964:1-2003:3 -3.85 -5.60***
Japan 1964:1-1999:4 -4.52 -3.88
United Kingdom 1964:1-1998:4 -1.68 -3.51
United States 1964:1-2003:3 -4.26 -4.91*
The test statistic is the ADF* statistic in Gregory-Hansen (1996). The null hypothesis is
that the unemployment and in°ation rates are not cointegrated. The alternative
hypothesis is that they are cointegrated with a possible break in the intercept and slope of
the cointegrating regression. The asymptotic critical values (from Gregory-Hansen, Table
1, m = 1, C/S) are: -4.68 (10%), -4.95 (5%), -5.47 (1%).
* = reject at the 10-percent level
** = reject at the 5-percent level
*** = reject at the 1-percent level
26Table 8. Johansen Cointegration Test
CPI In°ation Rate and Unemployment Rate For First 1/2 and 2/3 of Sample
Country Full Sample ¸-Statistic ¸-Statistic
1st 1/2 of Sample 1st 2/3 of Sample
Australia 1966:3-2003:3 6.92 5.46
Austria 1964:1-2003:3 4.12 7.70
Canada 1964:1-2003:3 9.35 11.96
Denmark 1970:1-2003:3 8.37 9.90
Finland 1964:1-2003:3 7.92 12.54
France 1967:4-2003:3 12.83* 12.24
Germany 1964:1-2003:3 5.59 9.91
Italy 1964:1-2003:3 6.39 5.97
Japan 1964:1-2003:3 8.96 8.85
Norway 1964:1-2002:2 11.32 10.82
Sweden 1970:1-2003:3 12.38 11.54
United Kingdom 1964:1-2003:3 5.33 3.71
United States 1964:1-2003:3 10.34 12.61
The test statistic is the Johansen ¸-max (= ¸-trace in the present setting) test statistic for
testing the null of no-cointegration. An 8-lag VECM was used to compute the statistic.
Asymptotic critical values for the statistic are: 12.78 (10%), 14.60 (5%), 18.78 (1%).
* = reject at the 10-percent level
27Table 9. Johansen Cointegration Test
CPI In°ation, Unemployment, and U.S. Unemployment
Tri-variate Model Bi-variate Model
Johansen ADF Johansen ADF
Australia 28.88* -3.43** 11.71 -2.66*
Austria 37.18*** -4.01** 19.55** -2.98**
Canada 33.27** -3.89** 14.67* -2.47
Denmark 27.72* -3.89** 13.91* -2.56*
Finland 19.56 -2.98 12.66 -2.01
France 35.30** -4.16*** 20.41*** -2.04
Germany 24.82 -3.24* 17.65** -2.25
Italy 37.17*** -3.80** 17.53** -2.48
Japan 18.14 -3.57** 10.69 -2.95**
Norway 31.07** -3.46** 13.62* -2.03
Sweden 39.04*** -4.32*** 26.74*** -2.77*
U.K. 24.84 -3.33* 14.82* -2.84**
1% 35.46 -4.04 19.94 -3.40
5% 29.80 -3.39 15.50 -2.82
10% 27.07 -3.06 13.43 -2.49
The test statistic reported in columns 1 and 3 is the Johansen trace statistic. An 8-lag
VECM was used to compute the statistic. The null hypothesis is that there is no
cointegrating vector (r = 0).
The test statistic reported in columns 2 and 4 is the ADF test on the residuals of an OLS
estimation of the cointegrating vector. 4 lags of the residual were included in the ADF
regression. The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegrating vector.
The last 3 rows of the table report the critical values of the relevant test statistics at the
1-, 5-, and 10- percent levels.
* = reject at the 10-percent level, ** = reject at the 5-percent level, *** = reject at the
1-percent level




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Figure 7. Japanese In°ation and Unemployment rates, and 7-year centered Moving Average
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